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Abstract
A ‘duality’ is a formal mapping between the spaces of solutions
of two empirically equivalent theories. In recent times, dualities have
been found to be pervasive in string theory and quantum field the-
ory. Na¨ıvely interpreted, duality-related theories appear to make very
different ontological claims about the world—differing in e.g. space-
time structure, fundamental ontology, and mereological structure. In
light of this, duality-related theories raise questions familiar from dis-
cussions of underdetermination in the philosophy of science: in the
presence of dual theories, what is one to say about the ontology of
the world? In this paper, we undertake a comprehensive and non-
technical survey of the landscape of possible ontological interpreta-
tions of duality-related theories. We provide a significantly enriched
and clarified taxonomy of options—several of which are novel to the
literature.
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1 Introduction
Contemporary physics is built upon two central—and prima facie
incompatible—frameworks: the theory of general relativity on the one
hand, and the standard model of particle physics—a certain quantum
field theory—on the other. Although these two frameworks are strik-
ingly effective at describing the actual world in their relevant domains
(viz., macroscopic, astrophysical and cosmological scales for general
relativity, and atomic, subatomic and molecular scales for the stan-
dard model), they rest upon very different assumptions. For example,
one central feature of general relativity is that spacetime is rendered
dynamical (that is, it is not a fixed background, but rather ‘curves’
in response to its matter content); by contrast, spacetime remains a
fixed background in the standard model of particle physics.
This notwithstanding, various fields of physics—such as the study
of the early universe, or of black holes—lie at the intersection of the
domains of these two theories, and thereby call for a quantum theory
of gravity.3 Constructing such a theory capable of overcoming the ten-
3Strictly, one might distinguish different senses of a ‘quantum theory of gravity’—this
could be e.g. (i) a quantised version of a theory which describes gravity, such as a quan-
tised version of general relativity; or (ii) a theory which unifies general relativity and the
quantum-mechanical standard model of particle physics; or perhaps (iii) something else.
(Sometimes, theories of type (ii) are called ‘theories of everything’, since they encompass
all four fundamental interactions.) For further discussion on these matters, see [27, 62].
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sions between general relativity and the standard model is an ongoing
matter of profound difficulty; at present, there exist several candidate
options which remain the subject of active research. (Cf. [29] for a
philosophical overview of such options.)
According to the na¨ıve ontological picture presented by string the-
ory—arguably the most popular extant research programme in quan-
tum gravity—reality is constituted by one-dimensional strings, as well
as by other higher-dimensional entities called ‘branes’. Moreover, re-
ality is not made up of four spacetime dimensions (three spatial and
one temporal), but rather of ten, or eleven. But string theory embod-
ies another intriguing notion that should be of interest to philosophers
and metaphysicians—the notion of duality.
Associate with every theory a class of ‘models’, equivalently ‘so-
lutions’. As van Fraassen puts it, a model is “Any structure which
satisfies the axioms of a theory” [55, p. 43]. (Roughly speaking, phys-
ical theories are specified by certain dynamical equations; each model
represents one possible solution to those equations—hence the lat-
ter choice of nomenclature.) In turn, take it that two solutions are
‘empirically equivalent’ just in case they agree on all ‘physically ob-
servable data’, i.e. on empirical substructures, in the sense of van
Fraassen [55, p. 64]. Then, a duality is a mapping—i.e., a systematic
correspondence—between the spaces of solutions of two theories, such
that models related by that map are empirically equivalent.4
There exists not just one string theory, but rather five, related by
an intricate web of dualities. That is to say, each model of a given
string theory possesses (via the duality map under consideration) a
dual model, which prima facie makes very different ontological claims
4Such is the definition of dualities presented in e.g. [35, 48], which will suffice for our
purposes. Note that one might augment the criterion of ‘empirical equivalence’ by re-
quiring that all quantities regarded as being physically meaningful (whether observable or
not) be preserved under the duality map. We agree that the most striking examples of
dualities—including examples of dualities from string theory—satisfy this stronger con-
dition. However, in this paper we choose to work with the weaker notion of a duality
proceeding in terms of empirical equivalence alone, for this will suffice to make all neces-
sary points regarding the interpretation and ontology of duality-related theories. For more
detailed and comprehensive approaches to the definition of dualities, see e.g. [22, 24]. Note
also that it need not be the case that the duality map is one-one—it might instead be that
a class of solutions of the first theory is mapped to a single solution of the second theory
under the duality. This will be of relevance below.
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about the world, while nevertheless being empirically equivalent.5,6
Thus, at first blush, dualities instantiate the underdetermination of
theory by empirical evidence familiar from the philosophy of science.
In the case of dualities, however, this underdetermination is peculiar,
as the empirical equivalence of the solutions under consideration was
often not expected ab initio, but rather came as a profound surprise,
in light of their apparently diverging ontological pictures.
In this paper, we undertake a comprehensive yet non-technical
survey of the terrain of possible interpretative options for ascertaining
the ontology of duality-related models of physical theories in such
a way as to resolve any threat of underdetermination, introducing
several novel observations and options along the way; our hope is that
this work will both open this area of research to an expanded class of
philosophers of all stripes, bring enhanced clarity to the literature on
these matters, and show the way to novel ontological interpretations
of duality-related theories.7
5Here is a more precise description of the situation, for the most technical-minded
reader. The four best-known examples of dualities arising in string theory are ‘T-duality’,
‘mirror symmetry’, ‘S-duality’, and the ‘AdS/CFT correspondence’. In the case of T-
duality, type IIA superstring theory (one of the five superstring theories) on a product
manifold M × S1 with radius of the periodic dimension R is found to be dual to type IIB
superstring theory (another of the five superstring theories) on the product manifold M ×
S1 with radius of the periodic dimension proportional to 1/R [4, ch. 6]. Mirror symmetry
is a generalisation of T-duality to the case of topologically inequivalent manifolds. (For
a philosophical introduction to mirror symmetry, see [51].) S-duality relates solutions of
one superstring theory with string coupling constant gs to solutions of another superstring
theory with string coupling constant 1/gs; it is thus a so-called ‘strong/weak’ duality.
For example, strongly/weakly coupled type I superstring theory is dual under S-duality to
weakly/strongly coupled SO (32) heterotic string theory [4, §8.2]. Finally, in the AdS/CFT
correspondence, a string theory in so-called ‘AdS spacetime’ (the ‘bulk theory’) is dual to
a conformal field theory (CFT) in a lower number of spacetime dimensions (the ‘boundary
theory’) [4, ch. 12]. The AdS/CFT correspondence was originally introduced in [34]. In
this paper, the relevant aspects of these dualities will be introduced when needed in the
course of the dialectic.
6Some care regarding the notion of a ‘model’, or ‘solution’, of string theory is needed. In
each of the five versions of perturbative string theory, one posits a background spacetime
manifold; one may then write down certain fields (ultimately understood to be ‘coherent
states’ of strings—cf. [6, 28]) on this manifold, obeying (to a certain order of approxima-
tion) certain dynamical equations, consistent with the string theory under consideration
(for details here, see e.g. [20, §3.4]). These are the ‘models’ of the string theories under
consideration, which are related by dualities (for example, the background fields in T-
duality are related by the so-called ‘Buscher rules’—cf. [5, §14.2]). Note that these models
are often understood to be the ‘ground states’ of a more fundamental theory, called ‘M-
theory’. (That is, they are states of the more fundamental theory, holding only at some
minimal energy.) We will have more to say about M-theory below.
7For other philosophically-oriented introductions to dualities—including all the theories
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2 Review
In the recent literature, one finds the above-mentioned claim that
string-theoretic dualities present a case of underdetermination of the-
ory by evidence—that is, a situation in which there exist multiple the-
ories, each of which (prima facie) makes different ontological claims
about the world, yet which are all adequate to exactly the same stock
of (possible) empirical data. Such underdetermination is typically un-
derstood to be problematic for the scientific realist, for how can one
plausibly maintain that one’s preferred theory is true, if a range of
other theories are also consistent with the data? In e.g. [35, 48], au-
thors began to compile a taxonomy of interpretative options available
to the realist, in order to ‘break’ the putative underdetermination aris-
ing in the case of dualities. The two (allegedly) most plausible options
in this regard were claimed to be the following:
• (Discrimination.) Privilege the ontological claims of just one
of the two dual theories. That is, consider two dual theories,
T1 and T2, with (respectively) solutions M1 and M2 related by
the duality map. Na¨ıvely interpreted,8 M1 and M2 represent
two distinct worlds, respectively W1 and W2 (hence a case of
underdetermination). However, according to this discriminatory
strategy, only one of M1 and M2 is a legitimate description of
the actual world.9 Though coherent, this approach faces an ob-
vious problem: principled reasons for privileging the ontological
and their respective dualities mentioned in this work—see e.g. [47, 50]. For an introduction
to the philosophy of quantum gravity more generally, see [36].
8What do we mean, when we speak of the ‘ontological claims’ of (solutions of) a theory,
or of the ‘na¨ıve interpretation’ of (solutions of) that theory? In this paper, we take
the ‘ontological claims’ of a theory to be given by its ‘na¨ıve interpretation’; in turn, we
understand this to be an interpretation of the theory in question (a fortiori its solutions)
such that the worlds represented by the solutions of that theory are ‘isomorphic’ to those
solutions. (Here, we set aside legitimate concerns that speaking of isomorphism between
mathematical structures and worlds constitutes a category error—cf. [56, ch. 1].) More
technically, our focus is upon internal interpretations, in the sense of [11, 22].
9Throughout this paper, by the ‘actual world’, we mean a hypothetical world in which
the empirical data consistent with two dual solutions are observed. Though this use is
non-standard, it will simplify our discussion. It is also worth clarifying what we mean
by ‘legitimate description’. Suppose that one observes certain empirical data, and one
has to hand a certain range of mathematical models consistent with that data. In spite
of all such models being consistent with the data, it may be that one discounts certain
models, for certain super-empirical, philosophical reasons (more on this below). Such
models are, then, taken to not constitute legitimate candidates for representing the actual
world. The complement of this set of available models is the set of legitimate candidates
for representing the actual world.
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claims of just one of the two dual solutions appear (in general)
to be lacking (cf. [48, 54]).
• (Common core.) ‘Break’ the underdetermination by interpreting
only the ‘common core’ of the solutions related by the duality
map as representing physical states of affairs. In more detail,
consider again two dual theories, T1 and T2, with (respectively)
solutions M1 and M2 related by the duality map. On this po-
sition, the ‘na¨ıve’ interpretation of M1 and M2, according to
which these solutions represent distinct worlds W1 and W2, is not
correct. Rather, we should identify the mathematical structure
common to those solutions, and interpret M1 and M2 in terms
of only that common structure—call itMc. In so doing, the un-
derdetermination is (apparently) broken, for in so interpreting
M1 and M2, these solutions may be regarded as representing
the same world—call it Wc—the ontology of which is taken to
be represented by Mc.
In this paper, our concerns are twofold: (1) We contend that both
the discriminatory and common core approaches are more subtle than
has hitherto been appreciated—and in fact, both approaches are con-
sistent with a number of distinct, more fine-grained views, only some
of which overcome the putative underdetermination in the case of
dualities. (2) We maintain that there exist (at least) two further ap-
proaches for addressing the underdetermination which arises in the
case of dualities—these we call ‘nihilism’ and ‘pluralism’. Roughly
speaking, nihilism is the view that no solutions of dual theories con-
stitute legitimate descriptions of the actual world;10 pluralism is the
view that all dual solutions may be taken to represent the same actual
world—but not because such a world is represented by the common
core of those solutions, but rather because the structure of all dual
solutions may be instantiated simultaneously.11
In the remainder of this paper, we undertake the following tasks. In
§3, we propose an expanded taxonomy of options for the interpretation
of dualities. In §4, we present and set aside various ‘antirealist’ and
‘structuralist’ approaches to dualities—for our concern in this paper
is to interpret dual theories realistically; that is, to get a handle on
what dual theories tell us about what the world is really like. In §§5-8,
we discuss each of the above-mentioned realist interpretative options
in turn, and assess whether they succeed in resolving the putative
10One might wonder how nihilism can be compatible with scientific realism; we shall see
in §7 multiple senses in which this could be the case.
11We agree that such a view is strange. However, as we argue in §8.2, it is coherent, and
therefore deserves to be mentioned explicitly.
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Figure 1: Five dual solutionsM1, . . . ,M5, and their common mathematical core,
Mc. ‘Na¨ıvely interpreted’, such solutions may be understood as representing cer-
tain worlds (to which they are ‘isomorphic’—cf. footnote 8). If one such world is
green, this indicates that this world is regarded as being a legitimate candidate
for being the actual world. If the world is red, on the other hand, this indicates
that this world is not regarded as being a legitimate candidate for being the actual
world. Options (1)-(6) categorise different verdicts on which of these worlds are
regarded as being candidates for being the actual world in this sense.
underdetermination arising from dualities.
3 Taxonomy
What we call above ‘discrimination’ and the ‘common core’ approach
form just two of a substantially broader range of interpretative op-
tions vis-a`-vis dualities. To make this explicit, consider figure 1.
Here, M1, . . . ,M5 represent (respectively) five solutions of five the-
ories T1, . . . , T5, which are dual to one another.12 The solution Mc
to the right of theM1, . . . ,M5 consists in the common mathematical
structure of each of the five dual solutions.13 (The rightward arrow
12We here include five solutions with an eye to the five superstring theories. However,
any number of dual solutions greater than or equal to two would suffice for our purposes.
13What exactly does this ‘common mathematical structure’ consist in? This is a question
worthy of considered attention; thankfully, authors in the philosophy of dualities have
already done much to clarify these matters. See in particular [24, §2], in which this
‘common core’ is taken to consist of a ‘bare theory’—in itself understood to be a triple
〈S,Q,D〉 of (respectively) states, quantities, and dynamics, isomorphic representations
of which are contained in the structure of each of the dual theories under consideration
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indicates that Mc is typically constructed once the M1, . . . ,M5 are
given.) Beneath each of the M1, . . . ,M5 are sets of possible worlds
(1)-(6), to which the solutions are interpreted as corresponding.14 If
such a world is to be regarded as being a legitimate candidate for be-
ing the the actual world, we colour it green; otherwise, we colour it
red.15
Clearly, a range of interpretative options are possible. If each of the
worlds associated with M1, . . . ,M5 are regarded as being legitimate
candidates for being the actual world (cases (1) and (2)), then we
have a case of underdetermination: for given a set of empirical data
compatible with one of these solutions, we do not know which of these
five worlds is the actual world. Within this situation, two further
options are possible: either the world represented by Mc is also a
legitimate candidate for being the actual world (case (1)), or it is not
(case (2)). We discuss the underdetermination approach in §5.
Suppose instead that just one of the original dual solutions is re-
garded as being a legitimate candidate for being the actual world
(cases (3) and (4)); this is the discriminatory approach. (Clearly, our
decision to regard M1 as representing this world in figure 1 is made
without loss of generality.) Within this scenario, two sub-scenarios
again arise: either Wc is regarded as also being a legitimate candidate
for being the actual world (case (3)), or it is not (case (4)). In §6, we
reappraise the discriminatory approach.16
(along with, potentially, further theory-specific structure). For our purposes, it suffices to
know that the common mathematical core of two dual theories can be constructed in a
well-defined manner.
14Via ‘na¨ıve interpretation’, in the sense of footnote 8.
15Whether or not one regards a certain empirically adequate model as being a legiti-
mate candidate for representing the actual world will, to repeat, depend upon one’s prior
philosophical predilections—cf. footnote 9. We will see below a range of explicit examples
of such predilections.
16Let us demonstrate that (3) and (4) are distinct options by way of an analogy with
a well-known case in the literature on symmetry transformations. Consider models of
Newtonian gravitation theory, set in Newtonian spacetime (cf. [13, ch. 2]); letM1, . . . ,M5
correspond to solutions of this theory which differ only with regard to the absolute velocity
of (the centre of mass of) the entire material content of the universe; letM1, in particular,
be the model which states that the absolute velocity of (the centre of mass of) the entire
material content of the universe is zero; and letMc be the model of Newtonian mechanics
set in Galilean spacetime corresponding to M1, . . . ,M5, in which the notion of absolute
velocity has been excised. Note thatM1 andMc make different ontological claims about
the world: the former states that the absolute velocity of the material content of the
universe is zero; the latter states that this is undefined. (Cf. [55, pp. 45-46].)
With this in mind, let us now consider (3) and (4), beginning with the latter. According
to this position, only M1 of M1, . . . ,M5 is a legitimate candidate for representing the
actual world. Why would one think this? One reason would be on the grounds of the
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Finally, suppose that none of the worlds represented byM1, . . . ,M5
are regarded as being legitimate candidates for being the actual world
(cases (5) and (6))—this is the nihilist gambit. Again, within such a
scenario, either Wc may be regarded as itself being a legitimate can-
didate for being the actual world (case (5)), or it may not (case (6)).
We discuss nihilism in §7.
Setting things up in the above manner is significantly more nu-
anced than extant taxonomies of interpretative options. For exam-
ple, this framework illustrates that the discriminatory approach—
represented in cases (3) and (4)—is not to be regarded as disjoint
from the common core approach—represented by cases (1), (3), and
(5).
After discussing options (1)-(6) in §§5-7 of this paper, we consider
in §8 whether there exist any alternatives to the common core ap-
proach (note that these alternatives are not represented in figure 1).
We identify two: (i) a tactic—common in the physics literature—of
attempting to embed the two dual theories into some ‘deeper’ theory
(§8.1); and (ii) the ‘pluralist’ strategy indicated above, in which the
structures of all dual solutions are regarded as being jointly instanti-
ated (§8.2).
principle of sufficient reason (PSR)—i.e. (roughly speaking) Leibniz’s principle that God
must have a sufficient reason to realise one of a class of symmetry-related models of a
given theory (more on Leibniz’s principles below). Maudlin articulates the point clearly,
in the context of the same example:
But on reflection, the PSR argument cannot get off the ground in the case
of absolute velocity. Suppose that God wishes to create the material world
in a heretofore empty absolute space. God could give the material world,
as a whole, any absolute velocity in that space without affecting the relative
positions and motions of bodies. Among all of these possible velocities, one
stands out as special: absolute rest. For if God should give the material world
any nonzero velocity, He would have to choose a direction in absolute space
for that velocity to point. [39, p. 48]
If one accepts such reasoning, one may embrace option (4) in our taxonomy of options. In
addition, however, there still remains the question whetherMc—which, recall, represents
(na¨ıvely interpreted) a distinct world to M1, in which there is no meaningful notion of
absolute velocity—is a legitimate candidate for representing the actual world. If one does
think this, one will be pushed to (3)—one will think that either the universe is at rest, or
that the actual world does not contain facts about absolute velocity at all. If one does not
think that Mc is a legitimate candidate for representing the actual world (perhaps if one
is strongly wedded to a notion of absolute velocity in order to maintain the coherence of
one’s metaphysics), one will remain with option (4).
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4 Antirealism and structuralism
Before we discuss the above-outlined realist strategies for the inter-
pretation of dualities, it is worth taking some time to present and set
aside certain positions in the philosophy of science, which bear upon
the interpretation of dualities, but which we shall not consider further
in this paper.
The first class of such positions consists in ‘antirealist’ views, which
(in some sense) deny that questions of ‘ontology’ are meaningful, or
at least central to scientific practice. Stronger versions of antirealism
are to be found in logical positivism and logical empiricism. Loosely,
advocates of these views prioritise the observable, and claim that
‘metaphysical’ questions regarding the (unobservable) ‘ontology’ of
the world are, strictly speaking, nonsensical. (For some contemporary
discussion of the logical positivist movement, and its transmutation
into logical empiricism, see e.g. [7, 18, 19].) A weaker view is the con-
structive empiricism of van Fraassen [55], according to which we should
be agnostic about claims read off from our theories of science regard-
ing the unobservable, and have credence only in the statements read
off from our theories regarding observable phenomena. (Thus, there
is a sense in which the antirealism of van Fraassen is ‘epistemologi-
cal’, whereas the antirealism of the logical positivists and empiricists
is ‘metaphysical’.)
Since both strands of antirealism deny (in some sense) that it is
of value to be concerned with answers to questions of ontology, we
set them aside in the remainder of this paper—for it is precisely such
questions which we investigate, and which are regarded (at least prima
facie) as being legitimate and worthwhile in the context of investiga-
tions into the ontological commitments of theories related by dualities.
As a halfway house between realism and antirealism, one may em-
brace a ‘structural realist’ thesis. There are many brands of structural
realism—see e.g. [15, 30, 31, 61]. One version of structuralism of inter-
est is the following: (i) the solutions of our best theories of physics are
constituted formally by certain mathematical objects; (ii) we should
take the world represented by that solution to be ‘isomorphic’ to the
solution itself;17 (iii) such a world may or may not be amenable to
description in terms of extant ontological categories—but regardless
of whether that be so, we should still believe that the solution of the
17Cf. footnote 8. Note that there are some subtleties here. First, such a claim can only
strictly hold true for fundamental theories, in which we believe that the totality of the
world is modelled by that solution of the theory in question. Second, such a claim effaces
important issues regarding gauge redundancies—i.e., aspects of the formalism of a given
theory which we do not believe to have representational capacities.
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theory in question describes some possible world (potentially the ac-
tual world, if the empirical substructures of that solution match the
empirical data from the actual world).
This brand of structuralism is certainly an interesting thesis, which
merits much investigation. However, we elide further such discussion
in this paper, for two reasons. First (and to repeat), we are interested
in saying something, in light of our best theories of physics (and espe-
cially in light of dualities), about what the world is really like; this does
not appear possible in general on the above structuralist view. Sec-
ond, we incline towards a more cautious attitude, according to which
we may only regard a particular solution of a particular theory as
representing a possible world (rather than being mere mathematics)
when we have in hand a clear picture of what that solution is supposed
to represent. In this latter regard, cf. [41, 49].18
5 Underdetermination
We return now to the taxonomy of realist options for the interpre-
tation of dualities presented in §3; we begin with the underdetermi-
nation view. One might not regard the putative underdetermination
presented by dualities as being problematic. Indeed, according to the
underdetermination interpretation, solutions of dual theories are in
fact all legitimate candidates for representing the actual world—and
we cannot ascertain which of the worlds associated with those dual
solutions (na¨ıvely interpreted) is the actual world.
Should one rest satisfied with the underdetermination interpreta-
tion? Arguably no, for in cases of underdetermination, it is impossible
to ascertain which of a class of empirically equivalent worlds—all em-
pirically adequate to the actual world—is, in fact, the actual world.
Thus, underdetermination gives rise to a sceptical challenge: absent a
means of determining which of a class of worlds is the actual world, we
have at hand no determinate picture of what the world is really like.
One might seek to overcome such underdetermination in the fol-
lowing way: identify the ‘common mathematical core’ of the duality-
18A second version of structuralism called ‘ontic structural realism’ is also worthy of
mention. (We do not comment on whether the version of structuralism presented above
should also qualify as ‘ontic’, in some sense.) This latter view finds presentation in e.g. [14,
15, 16], and appeals to what one might call an ‘ontology of physical structures’. There is
a sense in which, on this view, it is legitimate to make claims about ‘what the world is
really like’; however, such an ontology is to be explicated in terms of ‘structures’, rather
than ‘objects’. Since our concern in the ensuing is not with structuralism, we again elide
further discussion. For more detailed reflections on structural realism in the context of
dualities, see [9, pp. 178-189] and [35, §3].
11
related solutions under consideration, and take the actual world to be
represented by this common mathematical core.19 This, in effect, takes
us from scenario (2) of figure 1, to scenario (1). Note, however, that
in itself such a move is insufficient to resolve the underdetermination
under consideration. Indeed, there is a sense in which, absent further
philosophical details, such a move has made the situation worse: we
have, in effect, identified a further world which is empirically adequate
to the actual world.
If such a ‘common core approach’ is to constitute a viable route to
resolving the underdetermination, then it must be augmented by some
philosophical reasoning, such that the original dual solutions do not in
fact constitute legitimate descriptions of the actual world. One option
here would be to appeal to putative super-empirical virtues of just one
of the solutions under consideration (typically, though not necessarily,
the common core solution Mc)—e.g., simplicity, explanatory power,
etc.—in order to break the underdetermination. However, there re-
mains a gap to be bridged between such putative virtues, and truth-
conduciveness (cf. [55, §4.1]). Only if such a bridge is constructed will
appeal to such virtues move us from scenario (1) to scenario (3)/(5) of
figure 1. We return to this issue of breaking the underdetermination
in §6, on the discriminatory approach.
In this connection, one might think that another philosophical
principle delivering scenario (3)/(5) from scenario (1), and thereby
breaking the underdetermination, is Occam’s razor—i.e., the princi-
ple that, all else being equal, otiose structure should not be introduced
into one’s ontology. Note, though, that as with the virtues discussed
above, such a principle is first and foremost a practical principle, re-
minding us that it is (in general) preferable to work with (solutions of)
more parsimonious physical theories.20 Again, however, such a prin-
19Such a position is common in the literature on dualities—see e.g. [22, 24, 26, 37]. While
it is true that the common core approach is sometimes identified with structural realism,
note that the approach is distinct from the two versions of structuralism articulated in
§4—for (i) this approach still attempts to explicate the ontology of a given model in terms
of extant ontological categories (unlike the version of structuralism considered in the body
of §4), and (ii) this approach is not necessarily committed to an ‘ontology of physical
structures’ (unlike the version of structuralism considered in footnote 18). Of course, one
might still choose to call the common core approach a version of structuralism—but we
take this, ultimately, to be a semantic matter.
20In fact, there is a sense in which this is not true in the case of dualities. For example,
electromagnetism formulated in terms of a vector potential Aa is ‘theoretically equivalent’
(for our purposes: dual) to electromagnetism formulated in terms of the Faraday tensor
Fab (cf. [57, 58, 59]). Though the former theory has more structure (i.e., degrees of
freedom) than the latter, and so is in this sense ‘less parsimonious’, there nevertheless
exist many practical virtues of using the former over the latter—e.g. its amenability to
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ciple in itself does nothing to rule out as candidates for representing
the actual world the other dual solutions under consideration.
What is needed is a more robust metaphysical principle to exclude
all but one of the dual solutions under consideration as being candi-
dates for representing the actual world. One obvious option here is
Leibniz’s ‘principle of the identity of indiscernibles’ (PII), which (ap-
plied to worlds) can be understood (for our purposes) to state that
there can be no ‘distinctions without a difference’—that is, no em-
pirically equivalent but physically distinct worlds, which vary with
respect to unobservable structure. (The PII was famously presented
by Leibniz in the Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence [1]. For contem-
porary discussion of Leibniz’s principles, and in particular the PII,
see [52, 53].) Embracing such a metaphysical thesis seems to deliver
us from scenario (1) to scenario (5)—since only Wc does not possess
the variant undetectable structure under consideration, and is thereby
compatible with this principle. Of course, however, the question nat-
urally arises at this juncture: why should we commit ourselves to such
a metaphysical principle?
6 Discrimination
In this section, we examine the discriminatory approach, according
to which only one of the dual solutions under consideration is a le-
gitimate candidate for representing the actual world. This approach
is represented in scenarios (3) and (4) of figure 1. Claims appearing
to be consonant with this approach are found in particular in the lit-
erature on the ‘AdS/CFT correspondence’—one particularly famous
duality, in which a string theory in so-called ‘AdS spacetime’ (the ‘bulk
theory’) is dual to a ‘conformal field theory’ (CFT) in a lower num-
ber of spacetime dimensions (the ‘boundary theory’) [4, ch. 12]. As
Oriti points out, many string theorists speak as if the four-dimensional
spacetime of the boundary theory is real, with the bulk spacetime ap-
pearing only as an auxiliary construction [45]. For example, Horowitz
and Polchinski note that the AdS/CFT correspondence is a little dif-
ferent from other dualities in that the conformal field theory side is
exactly understood, whereas the string theory side is only approxi-
mately understood. Building on this, they write,
In the AdS/CFT case, the situation may not be so symmet-
ric, in that for now the gauge side has an exact description
and the string/gravity side only an approximate one: we
variational principles; locality principles; etc. (cf. [10, 44]). Of course, strictly speaking
this is compatible with Occam’s razor, for in the foregoing language, all else is not equal.
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might take the point of view that strings and spacetime
are “emergent” and that the ultimate precise description
of the theory will be in variables closer to the CFT form.
[25, p. 230]
Here, Horowitz and Polchinski appear to claim that since one of
a pair of dual theories (here, the conformal field theory) is better un-
derstood, we should privilege the ontological claims associated with
solutions of that theory over those of its dual (here, the bulk string
theory). Faced with such a passage, the question arises naturally: why
should the epistemological fact about what human beings happen to
currently know about two dual theories relative to one another warrant
the metaphysical conclusion that the theory about which we currently
know more must give the correct description of the world? Such wor-
ries have been expressed by Teh [54, §4], and most explicitly by Dieks,
van Dongen, and De Haro [12, 23]. What is needed is some argument
to the effect that one description of the world has metaphysical prior-
ity over its dual; such authors, however, treat this with suspicion—for
example, Teh writes, “We have no good reason to think of the gravita-
tional side of the duality as metaphysically emergent from the gauge
theory side, or vice versa” [54, p. 310].
Is this response to Horowitz and Polchinski reasonable? In fact,
there is perhaps room to defend the discriminatory apporach to duali-
ties such as the AdS/CFT correspondence in the face of such criticism.
Here is an alternative way to read Horowitz and Polchinski: it is not
that we simply better understand one of the two dual theories (namely,
the CFT); rather, it is that we only have available the full mathemat-
ical structure of the CFT, whereas the other dual theory—the AdS
string theory—is only partly constructed (our understanding of the
AdS side of the AdS/CFT duality is inherently perturbative—cf. [2]).
The question here is not (pace the argument above) one of our only in-
vesting with ontological import those physical theories which we best
understand, but rather one of our only investing with ontological im-
port those physical theories which which we actually have to hand.
Absent a completion of the AdS string theory, why take seriously its
ontological claims (na¨ıvely interpreted)—or even think that such a
coherent completion and subsequent interpretation is to be had?21
Though it seems to us that such a defence of the discriminatory
approach is reasonable in context of dualities such as the AdS/CFT
correspondence, in which the full structure of only one of the duality-
21We are grateful to an anonymous referee for helpful discussion on this point. Note
that there is some parallel between the caution advanced in the above paragraph, and that
presented in the context of dualities in [49].
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related theories is available, let us now consider other ways in which
the metaphysical primacy of one of the dual theories might be estab-
lished. Such principles might be e.g. the super-empirical, or metaphys-
ical, principles introduced in §5. However, as we have already seen,
such super-empirical principles do not go far enough, for they do not
preclude certain worlds from being legitimate candidates for being the
actual world; moreover, while metaphysical principles such as the PII
arguably do not face such difficulties, we appear to lack independent
reason to embrace such principles.
It is worth dwelling a little longer upon how a defence of the dis-
criminatory approach based upon the PII might proceed. Consider the
situation in which two theories T1 and T2 are dual, with each solution
of T1 corresponding to a class of solutions of T2.22 If one also embraces
the PII, then one should not regard the elements of this class of solu-
tions of T2 as representing distinct worlds. But which (unique) world
should one take these solutions to represent? One natural answer is
that one should take this world to be that represented by the unique
solution of T1 (na¨ıvely interpreted) to which this class of solutions of
T2 corresponds.23
Note that here the PII is being put to a different use to that in §5.
While in that case, the principle was used to establish that neither
dual solution represents the actual world (rather, only their mathe-
matical common core does so), here the principle is used to establish,
in light of ‘gauge redundancy’ in one of the two dual theories under
consideration, that the ontological claims of the other dual theory are
to be preferred. These are, then, inter- versus intra-theoretic applica-
tions of the PII; in our view, both are in principle legitimate.
7 Nihilism
If all dual theories are to be considered on a par vis-a`-vis the le-
gitimacy of their ontological claims, then one must advocate either
interpretations (1) and (2) in figure 1 (viz., underdetermination in-
terpretations), or interpretations (5) and (6). It is these latter two
approaches which we now discuss; we call these ‘nihilist’ strategies. In
particular, we focus on (6), for we have seen above circumstances in
which one may be led to interpretation (5)—e.g., through embracing
both the common core interpretation and the PII, the latter in order
22Cf. footnote 4.
23This, indeed, is exactly the standard answer given in the case of e.g. the theoretical
equivalence of Newtonian gravitation theory set in Galilean spacetime, and Newton-Cartan
theory—cf. [17, 33, 49, 57].
15
to exclude the legitimacy the original dual solutions qua descriptions
of the actual world.
As we see it, one might endorse nihilism for two reasons. The first
applies in cases in which the dual theories under consideration are
not expected to be final theories. In this case, one might claim that
solutions of non-final theories (na¨ıvely interpreted) simply cannot be
understood to represent any possible world. There is something to be
said for this view, for consider e.g. solutions of Newtonian mechanics—
an uncontroversial case of a non-final theory. It is well-known that
the stability of matter cannot be accounted for in this theory; for this,
one must proceed to some quantum-mechanical successor. But in that
case, how could solutions of this non-final theory constitute legitimate
candidates for representing the actual world? Thus, in this regard, one
might be a nihilist about the ontological claims of any non-final dual
theory, while still remaining a scientific realist—for in this case, one
might still maintain that solutions of a final theory could constitute
legitimate candidates for representing the actual world.
The second sense in which one might be a nihilist is the following.
Suppose that, for antecedent reasons, one is unsympathetic to a par-
ticular research programme, e.g. string theory. In that case, one might
reject (for said to-be-articulated antecedent reasons) solutions of all
e.g. dual string theories as being legitimate candidates to describe
the actual world, while remaining a realist, for one might think that
solutions of other theories (e.g. loop quantum gravity, or extensions
thereof) may legitimately describe the actual world.
In brief, then: nihilism is compatible with scientific realism just
so long as there is some solution of some theory which one takes to
constitute a legitimate description of the actual world. Perhaps such
a solution is provided by looking to the mathematical common core
of the dual solutions under consideration—in which case, one finds
oneself in situation (5) of figure 1. Otherwise, one finds oneself in
situation (6) of figure 1. But, what solutions could describe the world,
if not the common core, and not the original dual solutions under
consideration? It is to this question that we now turn.
8 Alternatives to the common core
So far, we have considered underdetermination, discriminatory and ni-
hilist approaches to the interpretation of dualities—these correspond
respectively to options (1) and (2), (3) and (4), and (5) and (6) of
figure 1. In this section, we consider whether there exist any alterna-
tives to the ‘common core approach’ (options (1), (3), and (5) in figure
1). In our view, there are (at least) two such options: (i) rather than
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Figure 2: The spaces of two dual theories T1 and T2, embedded into the solution
space of an ‘overarching’ theory, T˜ .
construct a theory which represents the ‘common core’ of the original
dual theories, construct a new theory in which each of the dual the-
ories are embedded (§8.1); (ii) argue that each dual theory describes,
correctly but partially, the same one world (§8.2).
8.1 Overarching theories
The common core approach purports to identify a possible world ‘iso-
morphic’ to the mathematical structure common to the dual solutions
under consideration. Though this approach is popular in the philos-
ophy of physics literature (see e.g. [24, 26, 35, 37, 50]), it is not the
only live interpretative option purporting to break the underdetermi-
nation. Indeed, a distinct position—widely embraced in the physics
community in the context of string-theoretic dualities—is to embed
the spaces of solutions of the two dual theories under consideration
into that of some deeper, ‘overarching’ theory.
What is meant by an ‘overarching’ theory? The answer to this
question is best given by way of example. It is sometimes claimed
that the five superstring theories are certain ‘limits’ of some deeper,
‘M-theoretic’ structure, in exactly the sense that their solutions spaces
can be embedded into that of this deeper theory—cf. figure 2. Such
an ‘M-theory’ is conceptually distinct from the common core of the
dual string theories under consideration.
A parallel example of this manoeuvre can be drawn from the his-
tory of physics: consider the relation between Heisenberg matrix me-
chanics and the (putatively) empirically equivalent Schro¨dinger wave
mechanics, in the 1920s and 30s.24 Ultimately, the unification of these
24For a detailed study of the relations between these two early approaches to quantum
mechanics, see [42, 43].
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two theories did not proceed by finding their mathematical common
core; rather, the two theories were embedded into a deeper theory—
what we now refer to as orthodox quantum mechanics (see [43, §5]).
This latter theory has a richer space of solutions than that of the two
original theories—again, the structure is as per figure 2.
What to make of this approach with regard to the problem of un-
derdetermination arising in the context of dualities? Merely embed-
ding the spaces of solutions of the two dual theories into that of some
‘deeper’ theory does not in itself resolve the underdetermination—for
again, given the empirical evidence compatible with one dual solution,
it is not clear whether one should embrace the ontological claims of
that solution, or of its dual, or of the overarching theory.
In fact, the situation here is even more subtle, and merits more
detailed consideration; two scenarios are possible. First, if this ‘em-
bedding’ of (the solution spaces of) two dual theories T1 and T2 into
that of some overarching theory T˜ is such that solutions of T1 and
T2 just are solutions of T˜ , then it is clear that, for those solutions, T˜
(na¨ıvely interpreted) does not offer a distinct ontological picture over
and above that of T1 and T2. In that case, we cannot interpret the
ontology of these solutions in terms of the ontology of T˜ ; that is, the
introduction of T˜ does nothing to resolve the problem of underdeter-
mination which arises in the context of string-theoretic dualities. In
such a case, one seeking this end would need recourse to (for example)
one of the other interpretative options elaborated in this paper.25
Second, suppose that (somehow, in some sense not fully captured
by e.g. figure 2) solutions of T˜ (na¨ıvely interpreted) are taken to offer
a distinct ontological picture from solutions of T1 and T2. In that case,
one may say that the problem of underdetermination is resolved by
interpreting solutions of T1 and T2 in terms of the ontology associated
to the solutions of T˜—however, as before, the problem is only truly
resolved if some further, metaphysical principle is embraced—to the
effect that worlds represented by solutions of T1 and T2 are not legiti-
mate candidates for being the actual world, whereas those represented
by solutions of T˜ are legitimate such candidates. In this case, how-
ever, it is unclear that e.g. the PII could deliver this verdict—for it
need not be the case that the solutions of T˜ have less structure than
those of T1 and T2 (as was the case in the common core approach)—
but this is a crucial assumption of PII-style arguments, which are used
to conclude that the ontology of the ‘new’ theory under consideration
is to be preferred. Perhaps some explanatory thesis may be advo-
25In this sense, the overarching theory approach can be combined with the common core
approach. For further detailed discussion of the differences between these two approaches,
and the extent to which they can be combined, see [21].
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cated here instead: ‘since the overarching theory can account for more
physical scenarios in its enriched space of solutions, that approach is
to be preferred.’ However, again, it is not clear whether touting of
such super-empirical virtues truly resolves the metaphysical problem
of underdetermination. Moreover, it is not clear that such explanatory
reasoning is sound, for recall that in the context of classical gravity,
the fact that the solution space of general relativity is enriched over
that of the alternative programme of ‘shape dynamics’ is sometimes
taken to constitute an advantage of the latter theory over the former.26
8.2 Pluralism
The second alternative to the common core approach we dub ‘plural-
ism’. On this approach, we consider the (distinct) structures of each
of the dual solutions under consideration as describing co-instantiated
structures in the actual world. That is, on this view, dual solutions
may be taken to represent parts of one world. Each dual describes
a seemingly different reality, but each of the structures under con-
sideration represents a numerically distinct part of one world. Thus,
according to pluralism, the physical world is in a certain sense frag-
mented.27
The pluralist strategy must pass a number of hurdles, if it is to be
regarded as being successful. First, if pluralism is to resolve the puta-
tive underdetermination arising in cases of dualities, then, as before,
some principled argument according to which the original dual solu-
tions are not legitimate candidates for representing the actual world
must be issued. Note, though, that this is not a problem particular to
pluralism.
As we see it, there exist two central particular issues for plural-
ism: an overdetermination problem, and an ontological problem. On
the former, since each of the individual dual solutions has certain em-
pirical substructures, taken to correspond to the body of empirical
data in the actual world, it seems that the pluralist strategy has, in a
certain sense, swapped a problem of underdetermination for a prob-
lem of overdetermination, for now all of the dual structures may be
26The claim here is that, since shape dynamics has a restricted space of solutions as
compared with general relativity, it is ‘more predictive’. See e.g. [3, 40] for further discus-
sion.
27Pluralism is incompatible with our definition of the common core approach, since
according to the latter we should read the ontology in (roughly speaking) the intersection
of the mathematical structures of the two duals under consideration, rather than the union
of those structures as on the pluralist approach. Nevertheless, a ‘fragmented’ ontology
could, in principle, be consistent with the common core approach. Our thanks to Keizo
Matsubara for discussion on this point.
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taken to account for that body of empirical data. On the latter, the
ontological problem is to understand what such a ‘fragmented’ world
might look like, and whether the notion is consistent.
Let us focus upon the overdetermination problem. There exist
two central options available by way of response to this issue: ei-
ther the pluralist may claim (a) that only one of the co-instantiated
dual structures gives rise to the observed empirical data in the actual
world,28 or she may claim (b) that that all such structures account
non-redundantly for that data. In our view, there exist legitimate
concerns regarding both proposals; let us discuss them in turn.
On the former view—(a)—the observed empirical data in the ac-
tual world may be accounted for by appeal to just one of the dual
structures—though we do not know which one. Clearly, such an option
is problematic, for it merely pushes the putative underdetermination
arising in the case of dualities from the question of which of a num-
ber of worlds (i.e., those corresponding to the dual solutions, na¨ıvely
interpreted) could be the actual world, to the question of which of
a number of distinct structures within a world could be that which
accounts for the observed empirical data.
In order to maintain the latter view—(b)—the pluralist will argue
that, in fact, all of the co-instantiated dual structures are necessary
for accounting for the observed body of empirical data in the actual
world.29 It is not, however, clear that such a view is compelling, for
it certainly appears that each of the dual structures could account for
the observed empirical data in and of themselves. This point is best
illustrated by way of example.
Consider electromagnetism, formulated in terms of the vector po-
tential Aa.30 It is well-known that the space of solutions of this the-
ory partitions into equivalence classes of solutions, elements of each of
which are related by a U (1) gauge transformation, and are regarded as
being empirically equivalent (since each of these gauge-equivalent solu-
tions gives rise—up to isomorphism—to the same Faraday tensor Fab,
which is taken to encode the observable data in the theory). In this
case, we face an apparent problem of underdetermination analogous to
that arising in the case of dualities,31 for one might ask: ‘which of the
28The emphasis here is on ‘observed’. Both of the dual structures are, by construction,
compatible with the same empirical data. However, in a pluralist world, it could (prima
facie) be the case that the ontology which gives rise to the observed empirical data is
either that of the first theory, or that of the second. This is the scenario countenanced in
case (a).
29One recent notion in metaphysics to which the pluralist might appeal here is that of
‘multiple grounding’—cf. [8].
30Cf. footnote 20.
31Indeed, one might treat the U (1) gauge symmetry of the vector potential formulation
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gauge-related solutions of electromagnetism instantiates the structure
of the actual world?’
Of course, in this case it is standard to maintain that the ‘true’
ontology of solutions of the vector potential formulation of electromag-
netism is that represented by the associated solution of the Faraday
tensor formulation of electromagnetism.32 Nevertheless, let us con-
sider how the pluralist strategy would pan out in this case. On the
analogue of the pluralist view here, each of the gauge-related solutions
in a particular equivalence class of the theory, the empirical substruc-
tures of which correspond to the empirical data in the actual world, is
instantiated in the actual world. But—and here is our response to this
position—since each of these structures could individually give rise to
that observed empirical data, it simply does not seem correct to state
that all structures together must be co-instantiated in order to account
for this data. To claim otherwise appears metaphysically otiose.33 In
our view, the central challenge for the pluralist is to articulate a sense
in which the above analogy does not hold, the co-instantiated struc-
tures do non-redundantly account for the observed empirical data, and
therefore the problem of overdetermination is evaded.
Thus, pluralism faces a number of challenges, if it is ultimately to
be regarded as being a compelling resolution to the problem of under-
determination in the case of dualities. Nevertheless, for the purpose
of fully mapping the terrain on this topic, and since the view is prima
facie consistent, it certainly deserves to be studied further.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we have cut the issue of the interpretation of dualities
along two distinct axes. First, which of the dual solutions under con-
sideration should be taken to constitute a legitimate description of
the actual world. The options here divide into three categories: un-
derdetermination, discrimination, and nihilism. Second, candidate
replacements for the ontology represented by the dual solutions under
consideration, na¨ıvely interpreted. Though the best-known approach
of electromagnetism as giving rise to a ‘self-duality’, in which case this example just is a
case of underdetermination of the kind considered in this paper.
32This is, in a sense, the analogue of the common core approach discussed above; for
the (heterodox) analogue to the discrimination approach, see Maudlin’s suggestion that
there is “one true gauge” [38, p. 367].
33Our mention of the co-instantiation of all gauge-related structures may remind the
reader of Pitts’ approach to gravitational energy in general relativity [46]. Exploring the
overlap—if ultimately any—between this view and pluralism would constitute an interest-
ing task for future pursuit.
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in the philosophical literature in this regard is the common core ap-
proach, we have identified in this paper two others: (a) appeal to an
overarching theory; and (b) what we have dubbed ‘pluralism’. This
latter position offers a novel avenue for the interpretation of dualities—
albeit one that currently faces difficulties.
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